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Abstract
Even the most casual survey of the various professional journal articles and books dedicated 
to the study of the nature, value, use, and benefits of meditation, in general, as well as the 
emerging field of the scientific study of contemplation reveals that this is one of the most 
active and promising arenas in the comparative study of Eastern and Western thought and 
practice. Yet, even though there are many facets of meditative practices that are common 
to both traditions, the contemporary Western tradition may be distinguished, in one way, 
from its Eastern counterpart by its current and ongoing collaboration with both the hard 
sciences and the social sciences. Recently, however, this openness to cooperation and work-
ing with the sciences has begun to spread to Eastern practitioners. In fact, Buddhist scholar 
B. Alan Wallace observes in Contemplative Science, «[...] there are [...] historical roots to 
the principles of contemplation and of science that suggest a possible reconciliation and 
even integration between the two approaches». 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Wallace is correct about this, the purpose of 
this paper is to offer an analysis and critique of the speculative/theoretical and practical/
scientific possibilities of «contemplative science» and the unique contributions of both the 
Eastern and Western traditions to this emerging science. 
Keywords: Meditation; contemplative science; Alan Wallace.
Resumen. Contribuciones de Oriente y Occidente a las «ciencias contemplativas»
Incluso la revisión más casual de los artículos de revistas especializadas y de libros dedi-
cados al estudio de la naturaleza, valor, uso y beneficios de la meditación, en general, 
así como el emergente campo del estudio científico de la contemplación, revela que 
se trata de uno de los espacios más activos y prometedores en el estudio comparativo 
del pensamiento oriental y occidental. Sin embargo, a pesar de que hay muchas facetas 
de las prácticas de meditación que son comunes a ambas tradiciones, la tradición occiden-
tal contemporánea se puede distinguir de su homólogo del Este por su colaboración actual 
y permanente tanto con las ciencias duras como con las ciencias sociales. Recientemente, 
esta apertura a la cooperación y el trabajo con las ciencias ha comenzado a extenderse a los 
profesionales del Este. De hecho, el erudito budista B. Alan Wallace observa en Ciencia 
contemplativa lo siguiente: «[...] hay [...] raíces históricas de los principios de la contem-
plación y de la ciencia que sugieren una posible reconciliación e incluso la integración 
entre los dos enfoques».
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Partiendo de la premisa de que Wallace tiene razón, el propósito de este trabajo es 
ofrecer un análisis crítico a las posibilidades teóricas y prácticas de la «ciencia contempla-
tiva» y establecer las contribuciones únicas de las tradiciones occidentales y orientales a 
esta ciencia emergente.
Palabras clave: meditación; ciencia contemplativa; Alan Wallace.
Introduction
It does not take an extensive internet search, or even a cursory survey of either 
popular magazines or the various professional journal articles and books ded-
icated to the study of meditation, in general, as well as the emerging field 
of the «scientific» study of contemplation, for one to realize that this is one of 
the most active and promising arenas in the comparative study of Eastern and 
Western thought and practice. In fact, a closer study of these materials reveals 
that each hemisphere has its own long and venerable traditions of adepts and 
practitioners who have created, developed, and extended their own meditation 
techniques and contemplative practices. Each tradition has a rich and fascinat-
ing history of first-person accounts of the assorted methods, techniques, and 
supposed benefits of various kinds of meditative and contemplative practices. 
Yet, even though there are many facets of meditative practices that are com-
mon to both traditions, the contemporary Western tradition may be distin-
guished, in one way, from its Eastern counterpart by its current and ongoing 
collaboration with both the hard sciences (i.e., physics, biology, chemistry, 
neuroscience, etc.) and the social sciences (i.e., psychology, sociology, anthro-
pology, religious studies, etc.). Recently, however, this openness to coopera-
tion and working with the sciences has begun to spread to Eastern practition-
ers. Moreover, Buddhist scholar B. Alan Wallace observes, «[...] there are [...] 
historical roots to the principles of contemplation and of science that suggest 
a possible reconciliation and even integration between the two approaches».1
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Wallace is correct about this, the 
purpose of this paper is to offer an analysis of both the theoretical and practi-
cal possibilities of «contemplative science» and the unique contributions of 
both the Eastern and Western traditions to this emerging science. The paper 
begins with a bare nuts and bolts account of the basic elements of «contempla-
1. Wallace (2007), p. 1.
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tive science» —the multi-disciplinary field of the scientific study of contempla-
tion and contemplative practices— as it is presented in the works of one of its 
leading proponents, B. Alan Wallace. It continues with a conceptual analysis 
of the terms of the discipline and a critique from the point of view of Western 
philosophy and theology. I then turn to a practical consideration of the pos-
sibilities and pitfalls of «contemplative science» from the point of view of 
contemporary Western psychology, with particular attention given to its 
potential impact within both the practice and science of psychology. Finally, 
I conclude with an assessment of the prospects of «contemplative science».
The basic elements of «contemplative science»
In order to help simplify and focus my discussion of the concepts, definitions, 
and principles of «contemplative science», I shall be limiting my analysis to B. 
Alan Wallace’s recent works Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neu-
roscience Converge (2007) and Mind in the Balance: Meditation in Science, 
Buddhism, and Christianity (2009). I do this for two reasons: first, Wallace 
does a rather good job presenting, explaining, and clarifying the basic ideas of 
this new «science», and second, his work includes all of the essential concep-
tual tools necessary to understand the field while also recognizing the work of 
other «contemplative scientists» (i.e., Antonio Damasio, Sharon Begley, Dan-
iel Goleman, Richard Davidson, Paul Ekman, Shauna Shapiro, and Jon 
Kabat-Zinn, to name just a few).
Wallace’s account of «contemplative science» begins, appropriately enough, 
with an etymology of «contemplation» and «science». According to Wallace, 
«The Latin term contemplatio, from which «contemplation» is derived, cor-
responds to the Greek word theoria. Both refer to a total devotion to revealing, 
clarifying, and making manifest the nature of reality. Their focus is the pursuit 
of truth, and nothing less».2 He also notes, in passing, that nowadays «con-
templation» usually means thinking about something.3 
Wallace then quotes the Thomist philosopher and theologian, Josef Pieper, 
who claims, «The first element of the concept of contemplation is the silent 
perception of reality». In order to help clarify Pieper’s claim, Wallace points 
out that for Pieper, «the silent perception of reality» is a form of knowing 
arrived at not by abstract thinking but rather by a kind of mental «seeing». In 
fact, he points out that the original meaning of «contemplation» and «theory» 
had to do with a direct perception of reality, not by the five physical senses or 
by thinking, but by mental perception4 —a kind of mental «seeing» or behold-
ing. In other words, the fundamental difference between ordinary «objective» 
knowledge and contemplation is that the former involves an active movement 
on the part of the knower (with his brain and bodily sense organs) toward its 
2. Ibid.
3. Wallace (2009), p. 7.
4. Ibid.
96  Enrahonar 47, 2011 Stephen J. Laumakis 
proper object, while in the latter the knower (with his mind) already rests in 
the possession of its object. 
Finally, Wallace distinguishes meditation from contemplation. He points 
out that the Sanskrit word bhavana corresponds to the English word «medita-
tion», and literally means «cultivation».5 According to Wallace, to meditate 
means to cultivate an understanding of reality, a sense of well-being, and 
virtue or excellence in character and action. So on his understanding, medita-
tion is a gradual process of training the mind and its powers of mental percep-
tion, and it leads (when appropriately practiced) to the activity and goal of 
contemplation in which one gains insight into and «sees» the nature of reality.6 
These are important and crucial distinctions in Wallace’s account of con-
templation, and their roots in Western thinking can be traced all the way back 
to the philosophical ideas of Pythagoras, and later to Plato, and, more clearly 
and unambiguously, to his student Aristotle —from whom we learn about the 
Pythagoreans. Wallace then traces the Western understanding of contempla-
tion from Plato to Plotinus and the Desert Fathers, and from the Pythagore-
ans to the Essenes to John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth.7
His account of contemplation in the East, on the other hand, focuses 
almost exclusively on the Buddha and the development of his own meditative 
practices —from samadhi to enlightenment— when he achieved «direct 
knowledge» of the nature of consciousness and the roots of suffering and how 
to realize genuine well-being through purifying the mind of its afflictions, 
cultivating moral and intellectual virtue, and gaining contemplative insight 
into the nature of reality (i.e., realizing the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-
fold Path).8
Wallace’s definition of «science» begins with his recognition that the term 
«has long been affiliated with the active (emphasis added) exploration of 
objective, physical, quantitative phenomena», but that it also may be viewed 
«in a broader context».9 Interestingly enough, that «broader context», which 
is supplied by Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, defines «science» 
in terms of both its method and activities —«principles and procedures for 
the systematic pursuit (emphasis added) of knowledge involving the recog-
nition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observa-
tion and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses».10 Wal-
lace then goes on to note that there is nothing in the «broader context» of the 
dictionary definition to preclude the possibility of first-person observations of 
mental phenomena and their relation to the world. In fact, he immediately 
draws an analogy between a scientist who makes observations and conducts 
experiments with the aid of technological devices and the contemplative who 
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid., p. 7-8.
 7. Ibid., p. 11-13.
 8. Wallace (2007), p. 11-13.
 9. Ibid., p. 1.
10. Ibid., p. 1-2.
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makes her own observations and runs her own experiments with the aid of 
enhanced attentional skills and the tools of the imagination. Based on this 
analogy, Wallace concludes, «In principle, then, there is nothing fundamen-
tally incompatible between contemplation and science».11
In fact, after carefully considering the history of the scientific externaliza-
tion of meditation12 (i.e., the typical third person approach to the mind and 
meditative practices —from the Renaissance with Galileo to Descartes’ dual-
ism and onward to William James, Sigmund Freud, and contemporary psy-
chologists, and cognitive and neuroscientists) Wallace then proceeds to show 
exactly how various «scientific» studies of the mind and meditation are paving 
the way for a paradigm shift from the solely, outwardly directed, objective, 
physical approach of the past to a more unified approach that includes the 
earlier third person approach and an inwardly directed contemplative, first 
person inquiry. According to Wallace, there are at least seventeen13 different 
«scientific» studies of meditation that move beyond the older, limited, third 
person, objective approach and now consider the mind, consciousness, and 
meditation from the first person point of view. These studies include: 1. Neu-
ro-plasticity studies of the brain’s ability to change neurons in response to 
experience; 2. Neuro-genesis studies of the brain’s ability to generate new 
brain cells and neuron connections; 3. Epi-genetic studies of how genes, the 
environment, and behavior affect the brain; 4. Anxiety and stress manage-
ment studies involving meditation; 5. Studies of the effects of meditation 
practices on terminally ill patients; 6. General Mindfulness studies; 7. Mind-
fulness based stress reduction (MBSR); 8. Emotion-brain-meditation stud-
ies; 9. Meditation and brain cortex studies; 10. Executive attention in chil-
dren studies; 11. Meditation and IQ impact studies; 12. Focused attention 
studies; 13. Emotional balance studies; 14. Meditation and Refractory peri-
od studies; 15. Meditation and Virtue studies; 16. Psychology-neuroscience-
physiology studies; and 17. Consciousness studies at the Santa Barbara Insti-
tute. Taken as a whole, then, these studies form the foundation of the newly 
emerging field of «contemplative science».
A critique of Wallace’s conception of «contemplative science»
There is obviously much to consider in Wallace’s accounts of both «contem-
plation» and «science». I will begin with a critique of his understanding of 
contemplation and then turn my attention to his account of science. 
What is particularly important and yet problematic in Wallace’s definition 
of «contemplation» is his failure to clearly distinguish (or even note) the 
differences between the active pursuit of ordinary objective knowledge and 
the passive reception of contemplative vision or insight. In fact, even though 
11. Ibid., p. 2.
12. Wallace (2009), p. 15-25.
13. Ibid., p. 27-36.
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he quotes Josef Pieper’s claim that «Intuition is without doubt the perfect form 
of knowing»,14 his own focus on the active pursuit of truth in contemplatio 
and theoria (and meditation, as well) causes him to overlook one of the most 
important elements in the traditional Western conception (at least for think-
ers like Aristotle and Augustine and Aquinas) of contemplation; that is, that 
its ultimate realization is a passio or undergoing, and quite literally, an in-
forming, a taking on, or a becoming the other through the passive reception 
of the form of the object of knowledge, in an intellectual vision and spiritual 
becoming of its being. In short, contemplative insight is a kind of vision or 
passive seeing or beholding of the way things really are, and not, as Wallace 
seems to insist, the active intellectual pursuit of or uncovering of or «making 
manifest» the nature of reality. A similar oversight can be seen in his definition 
of «science».
As far as his account of science is concerned, I shall concentrate on just 
four points. First, his definition and description of science and the scientific 
enterprise, like his account of «contemplation», focus almost exclusively on 
both as activities or methods of acquiring knowledge. In this respect, at least, 
he fails to distinguish (as Aristotle and Aquinas do) the pursuit of knowledge 
from the body of facts or truths that are the result of the activities of science. 
Second, he also fails to distinguish the scientific pursuit, and the resultant 
body of knowledge, from a third sense of «science» —as the intellectual habits 
or virtues of the mind or soul— that were clearly distinguished by both Aris-
totle and Aquinas. Third, there are important and essential differences between 
a scientist and her uses of technological devices and instruments in her third 
person pursuit of knowledge, and a contemplative and her uses of attentional 
skills and imagination in the first person approach. These differences open 
Wallace to the charge of committing the fallacy of employing a false analogy. 
Fourth, Wallace’s failure to distinguish the other possible senses of «science», 
as well as the inappropriateness of his analogy and comparison between the 
scientist and contemplative, both undermine or at least seriously weaken, his 
conclusion about there being «in principle» nothing fundamentally incompat-
ible between contemplation and science.
Each of these points also relates to a more general historical criticism of 
Wallace’s presentation of the terms «contemplation» and «science». For those 
familiar with the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, episteme and scientia are 
the Greek and Latin names for one of the intellectual virtues or habits of the 
soul. According to both Thomas and Aristotle, the human soul has certain 
cognitive (and moral) capacities, dispositions, or excellences (with respect to 
both theoretical/speculative matters as well as practical/productive matters) 
that when perfected through repeated practice allow the person to actualize 
their intellectual (and ethical) potencies. In the theoretical realm both Aristo-
tle and Aquinas recognize three intellectual virtues: nous or understanding and 
the intuitive grasp of first principles of a subject (understanding that «S is P»); 
14. Wallace (2007), p. 1.
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episteme or science and knowledge within a discipline that is rooted in syllo-
gistic demonstrations (M is P. S is M. So S is P); and sophia or wisdom and 
the comprehensive «vision» of the whole of reality. Each intellectual virtue 
extends our cognitive grasp of reality from its first principles up to what phi-
losophers pursue as their final end —an ultimate explanation of and insight 
into why things are the way they are. Understood in this way, philosophy 
(philo and sophia) as the «love of» or «concern for» wisdom is a life seeking 
eudaimonia or happiness/flourishing through the proper engagement in activ-
ities of the soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. For Aristotle, this kind 
of life was realized initially in the active, moral life outlined in the first nine 
books of the Nicomachean Ethics, and finally or ultimately in the life of intel-
lectual contemplation discussed in Book Ten of the same work. For Aquinas, 
on the other hand, this kind of life was realized in two ways: first, in the (par-
tial) natural happiness of this life —just as Aristotle had claimed; and second, 
in the (complete) supernatural happiness of the next life in the beatific vision 
and union of the soul with God. Understood in these ways, «contemplation» 
and «science» in their traditional Western conceptions connote a richer and 
more complex understanding of both the good human person and the nature 
of reality than Wallace’s rather partial and limited description would seem to 
indicate. As a result, they point to another area of concern with his view.
In addition to the conceptual criticisms and historical oversights of the 
idea of «contemplative science» noted above, there is also a broader difficulty 
with Wallace’s conception of «contemplative science» as the process or activ-
ity of reintegrating the pursuit of genuine happiness, truth, and virtue —what 
he refers to as three essential elements of a meaningful life— «in a thorough-
ly empirical way, without dogmatic allegiance to any belief system, religious 
or otherwise».15 Not only does he falsely compare the disintegration of the 
pursuit of genuine happiness, truth, and virtue to the modern dissolution of 
the medieval fusion of religion, philosophy, and science,16 but he also fails to 
note or indicate that the goal of «contemplative science» he has in mind is 
really nothing other than the original goal of Western philosophy (described 
above) —at least as it was practiced by philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and 
even theologians like Augustine and Aquinas.
Finally, there is a set of objections that may be raised with respect to the 
logical consistency of Wallace’s claims themselves, as well as in relation to 
certain Buddhist ideas. First, his goal of reintegrating the pursuit of genuine 
happiness, truth and virtue in a thoroughly «empirical way, without dog-
matic allegiance to any belief system, religious or otherwise», presupposes that 
all three can in fact be so integrated. This goal also appears rather paradoxi-
cally (if not contradictorily) to be dogmatically committed to empiricism in 
15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Ibid. (However, there was in fact no such fusion, or the fusion he has in mind was more 
accurately between religion, philosophy, and technology —because the term ‘science’ as it is 
ordinarily understood refers to the collection of activities that were not formally identified 
and distinguished until at least the Renaissance, if not later).
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ways that any classical skeptic would question. Second, the general Buddhist 
commitment to the uniqueness of each «particular individual» or event/proc-
ess/happening raises serious questions about the very possibility of a «science» 
—what is true of all particulars— of such. Third, if science really is (as it is in 
at least some thinkers in the West, for example, Aristotle and Aquinas) about 
the universal (that is, the form as abstracted from matter) and not the par-
ticular sensible thing, and there are no universals, i.e., Platonic Forms (as some 
forms of Buddhism maintain), at least not universal minds (as most forms of 
Buddhism maintain), then a «contemplative science» of particular minds 
appears to be conceptually incoherent. Fourth, even if such a thing as a first-
person science of a particular mind is conceptually coherent and possible, there 
still is the problem of induction from what is true of a particular mind to what 
is true of all minds, that is, a genuine «science» of contemplation. Fifth, given 
the objections that have been raised against Wallace’s conception and account 
of the principles of «contemplative science», and assuming for the sake of 
argument that they could be deflected, it nevertheless seems more appropriate, 
at least with respect to the historical forms of Western philosophical practices 
and usages, to designate his proposed discipline as the «introspective science 
of the mind» or the «science of the mind» or even the «science of introspec-
tion», the «science of meditation», or simply the «science of contemplation». 
For as Socrates once said, «to express oneself badly (or misuse words) is not 
only faulty as far as the language goes, but it also does harm to (or has a bad 
effect on) the soul». (Phaedo, 115e6)
Psychology and «contemplative science»
The previous suggestions with respect to both the possible designations of the 
discipline under consideration and its effects on the soul or mind clearly have 
a certain «family resemblance» to the current Western definition of psychol-
ogy as the scientific study of behavior, mind, and mental processes. In fact, in 
a recent paper highlighting the developing connection between Eastern and 
Western approaches to mind, behavior, and consciousness, Walsh and Sha-
piro17 provide a useful heuristic for thinking about this relationship. In their 
view, the East-West connection is undergoing a three-stage evolutionary proc-
ess. The first stage is one of mutual ignorance, in which each tradition remains 
blissfully and/or willfully ignorant of the other. The second stage is a stage of 
paradigm clash, in which practitioners in each hemisphere dismiss or patholo-
gize the other using their own unquestioned assumptions. Finally, the third 
stage they describe is one of «assimilative integration», in which practitioners 
from both traditions exhibit mutual respect, appreciation, and work collabo-
ratively. While particular individuals may be at different stages in their own 
understandings of the other tradition, there can be little doubt that Eastern 
thinking about the mind, consciousness, and meditative practices is making 
17. Walsh and Shapiro (2006).
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inroads in both the Western practice of psychology (with its increasing use of 
meditative and contemplative practices) and the Western science of psychol-
ogy (recall Wallace’s list of studies). At the same time, as we have already seen 
with Wallace, Walsh and Shapiro also note that Western practice and science 
hold promise for Eastern theorists and practitioners. Again, there can be little 
doubt that the West’s growing understanding of psychopathology, brain func-
tion, and brain plasticity (to name just a few areas of study), has important 
implications not only for Eastern contemplative practices, but also for the 
pursuit of physical and mental well-being.
A careful examination of Wallace’s list of the complex physiological and 
psychological studies currently being conducted indicates that Western psy-
chology’s interest in Eastern meditation has been concerned primarily with 
using meditative practice as a clinical intervention. Anxiety and stress manage-
ment studies involving meditation, studies of the effects of meditation on 
terminally ill patients, mindfulness based stress reduction, brain cortex studies 
of those engaged in meditation, as well as other forms of consciousness stud-
ies all clearly show that Eastern contemplative practices have made significant 
inroads as a treatment for psychological illness. More specifically, samatha, 
vipassana, and mindfulness meditation techniques, have been integrated into 
therapeutic approaches in Western psychology. In fact, ongoing scientific 
studies indicate that mindfulness meditation techniques are associated with 
the reduction of stress, moderation of anxiety and depression, strengthening 
of immune function, and decrease in reports of pain in chronic pain patients. 
Given the obvious physiological and psychological benefits of meditative 
techniques in alleviating stress, depression and anxiety, it seems quite clear that 
Eastern and Western approaches to clinical psychological practice have progressed 
beyond «mutual ignorance» and «paradigm clash», and have entered the stage of 
«assimilative integration». In fact, there can be little doubt given the ever-increas-
ing number of scientific studies that at least some Western psychologists are fully 
convinced that the two approaches are mutually enriching.
Moreover, this growing integration is reflected in the psychological litera-
ture. My colleague and psychologist, Greg Robinson-Riegler, and I have found 
that searches of Western Psychological literature using PsycINFO reveal a 
veritable explosion in research and articles on both the clinical and practical 
applications of mindfulness in therapeutic settings. In the last twenty years, 
the number of citations involving «mindfulness» and «therapy» have skyrock-
eted from a few in the late 1980’s to more than four hundred in the last six 
years —a hundred-fold increase!
A similar, though somewhat more gradual, increase can be found in cita-
tions related to literature concerned with «first-person», «Eastern», «medita-
tive», and «contemplative», studies of «consciousness». As we have already seen, 
these terms are basic to the field of «contemplative science». However, there 
is an important and fundamental difference between the Western scientific 
and psychological study of meditative and contemplative practices and the 
prevailing Eastern approaches to the same activities. Western psychology’s 
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scientific study of meditative and contemplative practices has been reported 
primarily through «third-person» methods and perspectives, in which an 
«objective, scientific» researcher observes the phenomenon of meditation 
«from the outside» by performing brain-imaging or electrophysiological 
recordings on meditation practitioners, or by performing some other type of 
brain comparison between meditators and non-meditators. Eastern approach-
es to the same practices, on the other hand, tend to focus almost exclusively 
on first-person reports (in conversations with one’s teacher or master) of the 
various states realized in the practices. As far as Western scientists and psy-
chologists are concerned, meditation has been typically viewed as an object, 
rather than as a method, of study. 
Recently, however, there has been increasing interest among some Western 
scientists and psychologists in the use of first-person methods, such as intro-
spection during meditative states, to understand the nature of consciousness. 
These same researchers, including B. Alan Wallace, reject the prevailing mate-
rialist scientific view that consciousness can be accounted for solely in physical 
terms. Accordingly, they advocate first-person introspective means as a meth-
od of studying and understanding both the mind and its states of conscious-
ness. In fact, one particularly interesting hybrid of first —and third-person 
methods, termed neurophenomenology was proposed by Franciso Varela in his 
article, «Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the ‘hard 
problem».18 His technique involved using «first-person» introspective reports 
as a complement to the neuro-scientific data collected by brain-imaging tech-
niques. Varerla’s idea was that first-person phenomenological reporting might 
help identify complex regularities in brain activities that would not have been 
noticed by simple, third-person (i.e., outside or external) inspection of the 
brain images.
Nevertheless, most mainstream cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists 
have not embraced the concept of an introspective, «first-person» science of 
the mind and consciousness, nor its combination with third-person methods. 
Although there certainly has been a marked resurgence of interest in con-
sciousness as a topic of study, and some interest in how introspective methods 
might inform us about it, either in isolation, or in combination with neuro-
scientific methods, the movement toward genuinely «first-person» methods 
—a genuine «contemplative science» in line with Wallace’s conception of 
it— has been slow to gain momentum in both psychology and the hard sci-
ence study of the mind, brain, and consciousness. In view of these facts, it 
would appear that we have moved beyond «mutual ignorance» to a «paradigm 
clash» —at least in the area of the science of psychology and meditation and 
contemplation— as opposed to the practice of the same.
Yet, there are some promising signs that things may be changing. For 
example, the Mind and Life Institute is devoted to the union of Eastern and 
Western approaches in the exploration of consciousness. Conferences spon-
18. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330-50.
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sored by the Mind and Life Institute have featured leading scholars from both 
Eastern and Western traditions in serious conversation. However, true col-
laboration is rare, and seems to consist mostly of Eastern practitioners serving 
as objects of study for Western investigators. The converse collaborative rela-
tionship —Western scientists serving as subjects within an «Eastern research 
paradigm» (that is, as contemplative practitioners)— is exceedingly rare. 
Though even here, things are beginning to change as more and more Western 
scientists and psychologists learn about and engage in meditative and contem-
plative practices. As previously indicated, the more gradual increase in citations 
—from approximately a hundred or so to more than a thousand (a ten-fold 
increase)— associated with the first-person approach advocated by Wallace 
and his colleagues, may in fact be read in at least two ways: first, positively, as 
a sign of increasing awareness, concern, and curiosity with the Eastern, first-
person approaches to contemplative and meditative practices and the study of 
consciousness; or second, negatively, as indicative of the dominant, and large-
ly materialist perspective of most Western scientists and psychologists. Accord-
ing to this prevailing view, since consciousness can in fact be reduced to brain 
activity only, no other brain functions or subjective mental states are necessary 
to explain it and/or its functioning.
The future of «contemplative science»
Despite the criticisms and objections of materialist scientists and psychologists, 
I think it is possible to offer a charitable and optimistic reading of «contempla-
tive science» that is both sympathetic to Wallace’s conception of the discipline 
and simultaneously mindful of the philosophical traditions behind both East-
ern and Western conceptions of «contemplation» and «science». According to 
this reading, «contemplative» refers to the first-person meditative technique 
of introspection of the mind, soul, or intellect that is seeking sophia or the 
«wisdom» pursued by philosophers. As a first-person activity, this kind of 
introspection and meditative practice is obviously personal and subjective, but 
the results of its pursuit of wisdom and/or enlightenment may become inter-
personal and objective when they are presented for third-person review and 
evaluation via careful definitions, and rational arguments and demonstrations. 
One goal of this highest human activity is, as Aristotle and Aquinas argued, 
eudaimonia —human flourishing, or living the good human life. «Science», 
on the other hand, and more specifically in the forms of cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience, refers to the third-person empirical study of the brain, 
consciousness, and the various internal and external senses. This third-person 
study, however, is actually a first-person activity when particular scientists 
engage in it. In addition to the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, the 
other goals of this activity are the application of science/knowledge to physical 
and mental health and one’s overall well-being.
When these two terms are united in the discipline and field of «contempla-
tive science» that Wallace envisions, the result is a union (or perhaps better, a 
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sublation in Hegel’s sense) via dialogue between scientists and meditative 
practitioners who are trained in both philosophical contemplation (i.e., first-
person practices and perspectives) and hard science (i.e., third-person prac-
tices and perspectives). As Wallace sees things, the union of these distinct 
practices and perspectives will produce a richer and more complex «second-
person» account that includes intersubjective and interdependent knowing 
and knowledge whose ends are genuine happiness, truth, and virtue.
While the actual achievement of reliable results in the emerging field of 
«contemplative science» is currently rather sketchy at best, it seems that the 
ongoing studies and dialogues engaged in and supported by scholars like Wal-
lace, Richard Davidson, and others, as well as the Santa Barbara Institute for 
Consciousness Studies, and the Mind and Life Institute, appear to be promis-
ing. At a minimum, Wallace’s conception of a «contemplative science» of 
consciousness based on a highly trained faculty of attention that can investi-
gate the mind from a first-person perspective ought to challenge (or at least 
give pause to) the dominant and prevailing materialist view of the Western 
scientific and psychological communities that consciousness and its functions 
and activities are reducible to brain states only. It is obviously too early in the 
development of «contemplative science» to predict with any certainty its pos-
sible outcomes and discoveries, but if the history of science in the West is any 
indication, it is often new ways of looking at the same old problem and object 
that eventually lead to breakthroughs in our understanding of things. Perhaps 
it is not too optimistic to think that the combined first-person and third per-
son, Eastern and Western perspectives and practices of «contemplative science» 
will eventually help us better understand our minds, our world, and ourselves. 
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